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Ganging Up Against the Courts: Congressional 
Curtailment of Judicial Review, 1988-2004 
Benjamin Keele, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. Congress has sought to exercise this power throughout 
its history, especially when the courts have issued a decision or series of 
decisions that are very unpopular. The precise nature of Congress' 
authority in this area is controversial and scholars have proposed many 
criteria and theories to delineate the legislative and judicial branches' 
respective powers. This study, examining the number of times Congress has 
categorically denied the courts' jurisdiction over a defined set of cases 
between 1988 and 2004, finds that Congress has denied jurisdiction 166 
times. This practice, while currently relatively narrow, could have major 
implications for the balance of powers between the three branches of the 
federal government and the vindication of individual rights if allowed to 
become more prevalent. 
The United States Constitution (art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 2) provides that: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the 
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the 
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with 
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make. 
Under this authority, Congress has denied the courts the power to 
hear certain kinds of cases. When the courts have issued 
controversial decisions, legislators often propose preventing the 
courts from continuing to make unpopular decisions by denying 
them jurisdiction over those cases. The scope of Congress' authority 
to curtail judicial review is subject to scholarly and political 
disagreement. 
I will examine the history of the executive and legislative 
branches' efforts to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal judicial 
branch. I will also review the scholarly debate over the power of 
Congress to curtail review over cases involving constitutional rights. 
However, little has been written on Congress' restricting review of 
cases concerning statutory law. Then, I will study how often and in 
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what ways Congress has denied judicial review from 1988 to 2005. 
Finally, I will discuss how Congress' empirical practices toward 
judicial review have implications for separation of powers, open 
governance and individual rights. 
Historical Attempts to Deny Jurisdiction 
In the past, lawmakers have attempted to limit the jurisdiction of the 
courts as a response to unpopular decisions. After decrying the 
unpopular decisions, legislators have tended to declare the judiciary 
an undemocratic institution that must be brought to heel by the 
majoritarian legislative branch. 
The concept of judicial review was first introduced to federal 
constitutional jurisprudence in Marbu y v. Madison (1 803). Marbu y 
established that the courts, as interpreters of the laws and the 
Constitution, had the power to invalidate laws and actions that were 
inconsistent with the Constitution. This power has made the courts a 
major influence in the political process of enacting legislation. Many 
laws that passed muster in the more political, majoritarian 
institutions have been struck down by the courts. There is 
considerable debate concerning the proper role of the courts in 
America's political system and how much deference legislatively 
approved measures deserve from the courts. I will not attempt to 
address that issue directly, but I will briefly review how Congress 
has tried to reduce judicial review in order to increase its relative 
power and implement its policy preferences. 
Using the authority articulated in Marbury, the Court began 
invalidating state laws in the first decades of the 1800s. 
Unsurprisingly, these decisions were not popular with state officials 
and their representatives in Congress. 
The first congressional attempts to repeal Supreme Court 
jurisdiction were occasioned by the Court's early decisions 
overturning state laws. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 authorized the Supreme Court to review, and 
therefore declare invalid, decisions of the states' highest 
courts that upheld state laws challenged as conflicting with 
the federal Constitution, federal statutes, or treaties. With 
each successive ruling striking down a state law, 
opposition to Section 25 grew among proponents of states' 
rights (Biskupic and Witt 1997, 337). 
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Proposals were introduced to repeal Section 25 and thus deprive the 
Court of hearing any state court decisions upholding a state law 
challenged on federal grounds. While the proposals were never even 
passed by a single house of Congress, the justices and supporters of 
the Court were deeply concerned by the move (Biskupic and Witt 
1997, 337-38). The Court later declined an opportunity to expand its 
jurisdiction over state court decisions, portending the future 
influence that attempted jurisdictional restrictions, even failed ones, 
could have on courts' decision-making. 
While the first attempt to restrict the judiciary's jurisdiction was 
unsuccessful, the second major attempt utterly succeeded, stopping 
the Supreme Court from deciding a case over which it was 
deliberating. After defeating the Confederacy in the Civil War, 
Congress enacted the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, placing the 
southern states under military rule until they met certain conditions, 
one of which was ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure 
equal protection of the laws for the recently emancipated slaves. 
Congress had also recently granted the Court jurisdiction over 
habeas corpus appeals. "Seeking to protect blacks and federal 
officials in the South from harassment by white southerners, 
Congress in February 1867 enacted a statute expanding the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction to review denials of writs of habeas corpus" 
(Biskupic and Witt 1997, 338). A case would soon arise that would 
make Congress reconsider the wisdom of its decision. 
William H. McCardle was the editor of a Mississippi newspaper. 
Displeased with the military government, he frequently attacked the 
generals and called for whites to resist reforms to grant blacks 
political influence. Major General Edward O.C. Ord, the commander 
of the military district in which McCardle published, finally tired of 
McCardle's complaints and charged him with several offenses, 
including inciting insurrection and libel. Ord charged McCardle in a 
military court. McCardle argued that trying him before a military 
court was unconstitutional and filed a petition for habeas corpus. The 
trial court denied habeas corpus and McCardle used the 1867 statute 
to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The Court heard arguments in the case and, given the Court's 
disapproval of trying civilians in military courts while civilian courts 
were available (Ex Parte Miligan 1866), Republicans rightly feared 
that McCardle's incarceration (and the Reconstruction Acts that 
authorized it) would be invalidated. They managed to insert an 
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amendment to withdraw the Court's jurisdiction over writs of habeas 
corpus and any such cases before it. The bill was enacted over the 
veto of President Andrew Johnson. The Court then duly dismissed 
McCardle's case before it was able to rule on the merits. "Chief 
Justice Salmon P. Chase wrote that the Constitution gave Congress 
the authority to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction 
and that Congress had expressly exercised that authority" (Biskupic 
and Witt 1997, 339). Thus, Congress was able to preserve the 
Reconstruction Acts. 
The circumstances of this successful denial of jurisdiction show 
some of the ingredients of such restrictions: cases preceding the 
denial were sufficiently unpopular to garner great support for 
denying jurisdiction, the denial would permit the execution of policy 
that Congress preferred, and supporters of the courts did not 
persuasively advocate for maintaining a relatively strong judiciary. 
These ingredients will help show why some congressional denials of 
jurisdiction pass, while the vast majority of those proposed do not. 
Lawmakers have habitually introduced bills to curb the courts' 
jurisdiction. 
The congressional weapon that is probably most often 
raised against the federal judiciary is that of curtailing its 
jurisdiction. Countless efforts of this kind have been 
recorded; casual perusal of Charles Warren's Supreme 
Court history for the nineteenth century alone discloses 
their occurrence in 1808, 1821, 1822, 1824, 1825, 1826, 
1830, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1846, 1858, 1867, 1868, 1871, 
1872, and 1882. Almost every occasion is clearly traceable 
to momentous constitutional rulings, most of them 
declarations of unconstitutionality (Choper 1980, 145). 
The judiciary's jurisdiction has not been free from attack in the 
twentieth century either. The Portal-to-Portal Act eliminated the 
jurisdiction of the state and federal courts over rights to portal-to- 
portal pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Bills to limit 
judicial review were proposed in 1957 and 1958. It had only been a 
few years since Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), and 
the Court had also issued several decisions relating to national 
security that fmstrated legislators' quest to root out Communists 
from positions of influence. The Court, then, was not very popular 
with some lawmakers. On July 26, 1957, Senator William E. Jenner 
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of Indiana introduced a bill to deny jurisdiction over the following 
areas: admissions to practice law in state courts, proceedings before 
and functions of congressional committees, employee loyalty- 
security programs, and state regulations against subversive activities 
and school board rules relating to subversive activities among 
teachers (Pritchett 1961, 31). Each of these denials related to a 
decision by the Court of which Jenner disapproved. 
Unlike the circumstances in the McCardle denial, opponents to 
Jenner's bill were able to take action to interrupt its progress. 
"Because of the widespread opposition which had been expressed 
against the device of limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction, four 
of the subjects which the original Jenner bill had forbidden the Court 
to touch were dropped" (Pritchett 1961, 32). Instead of denying 
jurisdiction to the Court, the bill was amended to reverse the 
controversial decisions by amending the statutes the Court had been 
interpreting. The jurisdictional denial relating to state bar admissions 
rules was left intact. However, what remained in the bill was 
ultimately moot because it was defeated in the Senate. 
Several factors contributed to the failure of the Jenner bill. First, 
Pritchett suggests that respect for the Supreme Court as an institution 
was a primary factor. "Basically, the Court was protected by the 
respect which is so widely felt for the judicial institution in the 
United States.. .a great part of opinion in the United States holds that 
the Supreme Court should be let alone, or rather that it should be 
subject to influence only in the accepted manner, namely, by use of 
the appointing power when vacancies occur" (Pritchett 196 1, 1 19). 
Pritchett wrote this in 1961, but respect for the Supreme Court has 
remained relatively high, even though recent controversies have 
somewhat tarnished its public image. "Currently, 57% of Americans 
have a favorable impression of the Supreme Court, with 30% 
expressing an unfavorable view. In the past, favorable views of the 
court surpassed 70%" (Pew Research Center 2005). Even though the 
Pew study indicated that the Court's reputation had fallen due to 
partisan fighting over nominations to the Court, over half of 
Americans polled still thought highly of the Court. This respect has 
been integral to warding off most proposals to strip the courts of 
jurisdiction over entire swaths of legal territory. However, as I will 
later show, it has hardly immunized the courts from smaller, less 
visible, piecemeal curtailment. 
Pritchett also mentions as reasons the bill failed the motives of 
the proponents of jurisdiction-stripping and the timbre of their 
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rhetoric. While northern Democrats voted to preserve the Court's 
jurisdiction, southern Democrats voted for Jenner's bill to limit the 
Court that had mandated desegregation. "It is paradoxical but 
probably true that the segregation issue increased the bitterness of 
the legislative drive against the Court and at the same time 
guaranteed the defeat of the attack" (Pritchett 1961, 120). Some 
lawmakers also exaggerated the negative effect the Court's rulings 
would have on national security. This hyperbole decreased the 
credibility of advocates for denial of jurisdiction. 
Another possible variable in the conflict between the Court and 
Congress was the Court's own behavior following the introduction of 
the jurisdiction-limiting bills. Terri Jennings Peretti argues that the 
threat posed by the Jenner bill influenced the Court's jurisprudence. 
Although the Jenner Bill restricting the Court's jurisdiction 
was defeated in the Senate (by only a 41 to 49 vote), the 
fierce congressional reaction appears to have had its 
desired effect. In 1959, the Court upheld HUAC authority 
in Barenblatt v. U.S. and state authority to investigate 
subversive activities in Uphaus v. Wyman. What Walter 
Murphy terms a "tactical withdrawal" is further 
substantiated by a 20 percent increase in the rate at which 
the Court rejected civil liberties claims from the 1956 to 
1958 term (Peretti 1999, 140). 
However, Pritchett argues that the Jenner bill had no effect on the 
Court's later decisions. "The danger of retaliatory legislation had 
largely passed by the time the Court handed down Barenblatt, 
Uphaus, and the other conciliatory decisions. The Court did not 
'save' itself by these decisions. It had already been saved because a 
majority in the two houses of Congress was not disposed. ..to use 
legislative power to override judicial determinations" (Pritchett 
196 1, 12 1). Even if the rulings that were issued immediately after the 
threat had passed were not influenced in any way, it is entirely 
possible that the justices wished to avoid such threats in the future by 
writing less controversial decisions and letting Congress' anger 
subside. 
Near the end of his book, Pritchett declares that "[ilt seems quite 
possible that the Supreme Court's victory in this controversy has had 
the effect of permanently neutralizing what is perhaps the most 
drastic congressional authority over the Court, the control of its 
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appellate jurisdiction" (Pritchett 196 1, 12 1-22). Later events would 
render his conclusion premature, if not incorrect. Controversial, 
high-profile decisions have stimulated calls for jurisdictional 
restrictions for the past thirty years. 
Burger Court rulings on abortion and school busing prompted a 
wave of jurisdiction-stripping bills in the 1970s. An amendment 
proposed by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina in 1979 would 
have deprived courts of jurisdiction over voluntary school prayer. In 
the 1980s bills were introduced to remove jurisdiction over abortion, 
school prayer and male-only military draft cases. Like their 
predecessors in the late 1950s, none of these bills was enacted into 
law. Nonetheless, jurisdiction-stripping remains a viable 
congressional tool to this day, albeit often in a less conspicuous 
form. 
Within the past few years, several court decisions have again 
prompted calls to restrict the judiciary's jurisdiction. In 2002, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
requiring the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public school 
classrooms violated the First Amendment because the words "under 
God" constituted an establishment of religion (Newdow v. US. 
Congress 2002). The highest courts of Vermont and Massachusetts 
have mandated same-sex civil unions or marriage, respectively. This 
led some legislators to fear that a federal court would eventually 
invalidate the Defense of Marriage Act, a law that allows states to 
refuse to recognize marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in 
other states. Legislators have responded by introducing provisions to 
remove the courts' jurisdiction over the Defense of Marriage Act and 
the Pledge of Allegiance. 
The House Judiciary Committee's report on the Marriage 
Protection Act argued that "Congress must exercise its constitutional 
authority to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to ensure that 
the states, and not unelected Federal judges, have the final say on 
whether they must accept same-sex marriage licenses issued in other 
states" (U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary 2004, 4). This 
invocation of congressional power to limit jurisdiction demonstrates 
that this tool is far from neutralized. In 2004, the House passed the 
Marriage Protection Act and the Pledge Protection Act (Bazon, 
Killian and Thomas 2005, 10). At present, none of these high-profile 
proposals have been passed by the Senate. However, since at least 
1988 (and probably much before then), Congress has been exercising 
its power over the courts' jurisdiction to insulate less well-publicized 
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decisions and rules from judicial review. 
The Scope of Congress' Power to Regulate Jurisdiction 
Along with efforts in Congress to limit jurisdiction have come reams 
of scholarly writings arguing over the exact scope of Congress's 
authority. The literature is voluminous to the point of unwieldiness. 
"[Olne might expect that the ultimate tribunal -- that of academics 
(who, unlike the Justices, often claim infallibility even though they 
lack finality) -- would have reached a consensus after more than a 
century and a half of scrutiny. But I can assure you that there is no 
such consensus" (Gunther 1984, 897). Commenting on why limiting 
the jurisdiction of the courts is so controversial, Mark Tushnet and 
Jennifer Jaff (1984, 1328) write, "we suggest that those concerns 
[over judicial jurisdiction] arise from disquiet over the fundamental 
structure of the Constitution.. .the practices of politics and judging no 
longer meet the demands of a sound constitutional order." They 
hypothesize that most citizens no longer have confidence that the 
Constitution itself will limit the courts' discretion to decree policy by 
judicial fiat. Thus, the power of the judiciary is increased (at least 
perceptually) and the boundaries of the courts' power become more 
politically important. 
Whatever the cause of the topic's popularity, a proper treatment 
of all the disparate theories regarding Congress' power to curtail the 
courts' jurisdiction would overwhelm the other parts of this study. In 
addition, most of the debate concerns Congress' power to deny a 
judicial forum for constitutional rights. Most commentators seem to 
take for granted that Congress may alter the courts' jurisdiction over 
statutory issues at will. Perhaps that alone helps explain why 
Congress frequently deprives the courts of jurisdiction over statutory 
issues and, despite an impressive amount of discussion, fails to enact 
legislation that pertains to higher-profile constitutional issues. 
Therefore, I will attempt to provide only a brief review of some of 
the most salient theories on restricting judicial review. This should 
supply adequate theoretical context to the historical and empirical 
evidence of Congress' practices in this area. 
Broadly speaking, the plethora of views on Congress' power 
over the courts' jurisdiction can be arrayed on a spectrum. One end 
represents the view that Congress is plenipotentiary with respect to 
the courts and can grant or withhold jurisdiction at its discretion. On 
the other end is the opinion that the Constitution requires Congress to 
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grant jurisdiction to the courts and that jurisdiction itself is 
constitutionally protected from diminution. In the middle, then, is a 
large variety of permutations of these two extremes. Some types of 
jurisdiction can be limited by Congress while others cannot; under 
certain conditions Congress can limit the courts' jurisdiction, as long 
as some tribunal (state, specially established, or otherwise) is 
available, jurisdiction can be denied to all others. A few 
representative examples will suffice to illustrate this spectrum. 
The first theory is what Edward Keynes and Randall K. Miller 
(1989) term the plenary view. Under this view, the language in 
Article I11 mentioning exceptions and regulations to the courts' 
jurisdiction authorizes Congress to confer as much or as little 
jurisdiction as it sees fit. "Unless Congress enacts jurisdictional 
legislation, the Supreme Court cannot exercise its appellate 
jurisdiction. Once Congress has acted, as John Marshall observed, 
the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction that Congress has not 
specifically conferred" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 4). Under this 
theory, the courts are wholly at the mercy of Congress. 
The plenary view may seem to grant Congress an immense 
advantage over the judiciary. "Congress could use its authority to 
emasculate the federal courts' power of judicial review. By 
eradicating federal jurisdiction over constitutional rights, Congress 
could upset the delicate balance of power between the legislative and 
judicial branches" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 7). While there is 
certainly a risk that Congress could simply choose to deprive the 
courts of all jurisdiction except that which is specifically provided in 
the Constitution, it seems quite unlikely. First, while Congress has 
historically proposed many bills to limit the courts' jurisdiction, the 
vast majority have never been enacted into law. Second, in order for 
such an extreme move to be politically palatable, the courts would 
have to become so unpopular that a sizable majority of the public 
would support eliminating wide swaths of the courts' jurisdiction. 
Given that a 57% approval rating is considered unusually low for the 
Supreme Court, the courts would have to become incompetent or 
issue such unpopular decisions that most government agencies and 
citizens openly defy them to be seriously threatened by such 
sweeping proposals. Finally, "since the political branches realize that 
the use of federal courts is essential to administer federal law-for 
the purposes of both imposing government coercion and enforcing 
private remedies-Congress cannot, as a practical matter, withdraw 
all federal jurisdiction, even if it were authorized to do so 
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constitutionally" (Choper 1980, 54). Government simply cannot 
function without the courts. It would be far more trouble for 
Congress to strip the courts of jurisdiction and erect new 
enforcement mechanisms for its laws than to reverse undesirable 
court decisions through statutory amendment and the influencing of 
judicial appointments. 
Further undermining the plenary view is the understanding of 
judicial review articulated in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 
78, Alexander Hamilton argues that the judiciary must be able to 
invalidate laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution. "If it be 
said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges 
of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is 
conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this 
cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected 
from any particular provisions in the Constitution" (Hamilton 1788). 
If Congress were able to prevent the courts from fulfilling this 
function by eliminating judicial review, it would be able to violate 
the Constitution without restraint. 
While proponents of the plenary view emphasize the regulations 
and exceptions clause, supporters of the mandatory view focus on the 
vesting clause: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Under this 
language, there must be a Supreme Court with the government's 
judicial power. "The only authority over the federal judiciary given 
to Congress in the original plan of article I11 was the discretion to 
establish and structure inferior courts, to distribute and allocate the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts among the Supreme Court and the 
inferior federal courts, and to make regulations of practice and 
procedure for these courts" (Clinton 1986, 15 18). Proponents of this 
constitutional interpretation hold that the courts serve a fundamental 
place in the government; therefore, one branch cannot reduce another 
branch to insignificance. "Admittedly, the exceptions and regulations 
clause confers some power on Congress, but it does not permit the 
legislature to destroy the basic structure of government or vitiate the 
Framers' remedial purpose" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 8). On the 
other hand, without some check on the judiciary's power, there is the 
danger of what some scholars and commentators call the "imperial 
judiciary," a judiciary that supplants the legislative and executive 
functions of government and brazenly implements its own policy 
preferences. 
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This risk, like the risks under the plenary view, is fairly low. 
First, courts are staffed by judges selected by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. This must have a crucial influence on the 
jurisprudence of the courts. Peretti (1999, 130) notes that "most 
justices, most of the time, satisfy the ideological and policy 
expectations of their appointing presidents. This is to be expected 
given the great care with which most presidents evaluate the 
ideological credentials of their Supreme Court nominees." Courts 
can thus be checked by selecting jurists who will not regard their role 
as that of an official who is empowered to unilaterally change the 
law without reasonable legal grounds. Second, Congress can amend 
laws to nullify undesirable decisions. This was the option that 
lawmakers preferred when they were considering how to respond to 
the Court's national security decisions in the late 1950s. 
Undoubtedly Congress has the authority to amend statutes to help 
clarify their interpretation. This check is not as readily available in 
cases of constitutional interpretation due to the formidable majorities 
that must be assembled to ensure passage through Congress and 
ratification by the states of constitutional amendments. Whether by 
appointments or overruling interpretations, Congress has means at its 
disposal to check the judiciary without limiting its jurisdiction. 
The middle ground between these two poles, generally speaking, 
is the view that Congress can restrict the courts' jurisdiction, but 
only with limits on that power. A number of limits have been 
proposed throughout the literature. One limitation proposed by 
scholars is that Congress cannot limit the jurisdiction of the courts 
such that the essential functions of the courts cannot be executed. "If 
the Court was intended the curb Congressional excesses in 
appropriately presented 'cases or controversies,' and if an attempt to 
exercise that power might in turn be blocked by Congress as a 
judicial 'excess,' then the Convention was aimlessly going in 
circles" (Berger 1969, 286). Congress cannot check the courts in 
such a way that the courts cannot check Congress. 
Since the actual text of the Constitution does not mention any 
limits on Congress' power to alter the judiciary's jurisdiction, 
producing a list of the essential functions of the courts is an exercise 
in discerning what role the courts uniquely fill in government. 
Keynes and Miller (1989, 16) suggest that "[iln a constitutional 
democracy, the courts must have judicial power to protect the rule of 
law, fundamental constitutional rights of individuals, and the rights 
of insular minorities." Courts are also supposed "to promote 
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uniformity of decision, to assure national supremacy, to implement 
national law, to provide a neutral forum for out-of-state and foreign 
suitors, and to preserve the citizens' constitutional rights against 
popular oppression" (Keynes and Miller 1989, 17). Any 
congressional restrictions on the courts' jurisdiction that prevent 
them from fulfilling these essential functions are unconstitutional, 
according to this view. 
The primary difficulty with this view is arguing that Congress' 
power to limit the courts' jurisdiction ends where the courts' 
essential functions begin is only another way of saying that 
Congress' powers end where the courts' powers begin. The branches 
of government disagree on which checks and balances apply to them 
and what powers are allocated to each of them. This is made clear by 
the argument of advocates for jurisdictional limitation that when the 
courts begin "legislating from the bench," they are usurping the 
essential functions of the legislative branch and Congress must check 
the courts to restore the proper balance of power. 
In many cases, the Supreme Court and other federal 
judicial bodies not only have exceeded their constitutional 
limits, but have challenged the principle of federalism that 
should protect the balance of power between the national 
government and the governments of the states.. ..America's 
Founding Fathers created a democratic republic in which 
elected representatives were to decide the important issues 
of the day. In their view, the role of the judiciary, although 
crucial, was to interpret and clarify the law-not to make 
law (Meese 1998,782-83). 
So if the three branches of government could simply agree upon their 
proper respective roles, they would not overstep their bounds and 
there would be no need for the branches to check each other, 
eliminating the need for congressional restrictions on the courts' 
jurisdiction. Since none of the branches can agree, they must check 
each other. However, since they do not agree on their proper powers 
or essential functions, one branch that is being limited by another 
claims that the limitation itself is improper and is upsetting the 
proper balance of power. The essential hnctions theory merely 
redefines the debate over the separation of powers that has existed 
since before the Constitution was ratified. 
While this review of the debate over Congress' authority to limit 
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the judiciary's jurisdiction is necessarily cursory, it provides a 
backdrop for examining what Congress has actually done to limit the 
courts' jurisdiction in recent years, a topic that has not been 
investigated extensively in the literature. I will now move fiom 
theoretical review to empirical observations on Congress' behavior 
toward the courts. 
The Empirical Study 
I studied the frequency and nature of congressional denials of 
jurisdiction from 1988 to 2004 to gain understanding of how the use 
of this authority affected the relationships between the three branches 
of the federal government. I conducted text searches on LexisNexis 
of public laws enacted between 1988 and 2004. This period was 
selected because it contained the earliest laws (the earliest is P.L. 
100-243, enacted February 9, 1988) in LexisNexis at the time and 
went through the 1 0 8 ~ ~  Congress. 
I conducted two searches for each Congress. First, I searched for 
"judicial review." This is the most commonly used phrase to indicate 
review of laws and executive actions by the courts. I accessed each 
public law that appeared in the search results and then used the web 
browser's "Find in This Page" function to find "judicial review." An 
example of the phrase in statutory language might read: "There shall 
be no judicial review of any determination under this section by the 
Secretary." I read the text surrounding each occurrence of "judicial 
review" and determined whether the provision was an express denial 
of jurisdiction over a defined set of cases or a defined set of laws, 
rules, actions or decisions by any government agent. If I determined 
the provision was an express denial of jurisdiction, I recorded the 
public law number, Statutes At Large citation, the number of the 
section containing the provision, and the set of cases, rules or actions 
over which jurisdiction was denied in an appendix that is on file with 
the journal and author. ' 
Second, I conducted a broader search in case jurisdiction was 
denied but the language did not contain the phrase "judicial review." 
I searched for "court*." This search yielded any law that contained 
the word "court" and any letters thereafter (e.g., "courts," 
"courthouse," "courtroom"). I then searched within these results for 
'1f you have questions or would like to examine this appendix, please contact 
the author at benjamin.j.keele@grnail.com or the journal at psajournal@union.edu. 
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the word "review." So, while the language "No court shall have 
jurisdiction to review any determination under this section by the 
Secretary," would not have been found in the first search, it would be 
found in the second search, thus providing a more complete count of 
provisions relating to judicial review. I repeated the "Find in This 
Page" procedure for any public laws I had not already searched. 
For the purposes of this study, an express denial of jurisdiction 
is a provision of a public law that categorically and explicitly 
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to review or hear a defined class of 
cases, set of governmental actions, set of rules and regulations or set 
of statutory provisions, or that repeals a previously effective 
authorization of judicial review. It will be helpful to illustrate this 
definition with some examples that do not meet it. 
Public Law 102-385, the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992, provides that any judicial review 
under the Act will be heard by a three-judge district court and any 
appeals from the district court shall go directly to the Supreme Court. 
This law, and many others like it, simply regulates the manner and 
forum in which judicial review may be had. Since jurisdiction is not 
completely denied but merely directed to specific places or in 
specific ways, such provisions are not congressional denials of 
jurisdiction for the purposes of this study. Also, many laws provide 
time limits for filing an action after which no court will have 
jurisdiction over the action. Again, these provisions are purely 
procedural in nature and are not the topic of this study. 
Section 410 of Public Law 104-1, the Congressional 
Accountability Act of 1995, provides that "[elxcept as expressly 
authorized by sections 407, 408, and 409, the compliance or 
noncompliance with the provisions of this Act and any action taken 
pursuant to this Act shall not be subject to judicial review." Here 
judicial review is regulated and constrained to a set of specifically 
authorized circumstances and legal grounds. For instance, if an 
employee of Congress feels her statutory rights have been violated, 
she must first go through counseling and mediation. If she is still not 
satisfied, she may either file a complaint with a review board or file a 
civil action in a United States district court. If she goes to the review 
board and loses, she may only appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. While judicial review is certainly 
being circumscribed, it is still available and thus laws that limit 
jurisdiction over an area of law but do not eliminate it are not 
counted in this study. 
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The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996, Division C of Public Law 104-208, limits the remedies 
courts are able to utilize in immigration proceedings. For example, 
section 304 provides that "Any petition for review under section 242 
of an order entered in absentia under this paragraph shall (except in 
cases described in section 242(b)(5)) be confined to (i) the validity of 
the notice provided to the alien, (ii) the reasons for the alien's not 
attending the proceeding, and (iii) whether or not the alien is 
removable." The legal grounds on which an alien can contest her 
deportation are limited by the law, but her ability to obtain judicial 
review is not utterly abolished. 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
also limits remedies available in habeas corpus actions. According to 
the conference report for the Act, the law "sets a one year limitation 
on an application for a habeas writ and revises the procedures for 
consideration of a writ in federal court. It provides for the exhaustion 
of state remedies and requires deference to determinations of state 
courts" (U.S. House Committee of Conference 1996, 11 1). The Act 
also establishes other time limits within which the courts have 
jurisdiction over hearing appeals concerning new evidence. While 
prisoners have some access to the courts, this access is limited, 
although not eliminated, by the Act. Provisions that only limit but do 
not deny jurisdiction over a defined set of actions or rules are not 
counted in this study. 
After collecting the data, I tabulated the number of provisions 
each Congress enacted that were express denials of jurisdiction. 
Because more than one denial of jurisdiction could be contained in 
one law, I also counted the number of laws within which these 
provisions were enacted. The table displaying these results is 
presented in the Findings. 
This study focuses on cases in which Congress enacted laws that 
deprived the courts of jurisdiction over a defined set of actions, rules 
or cases between 1988 and 2004. Therefore, bills that were proposed 
but not enacted are not reflected in the findings. Laws that were 
enacted that regulate or partially limit the courts' jurisdiction have an 
important influence on the powers of the judiciary, but could not be 
counted under the definition of express denial of jurisdiction because 
including them would have required developing criteria for 
classifying the different degrees of restrictions on jurisdiction, a task 
too ambitious for a study of this scope. Finally, to have a complete 
picture of Congress's actions toward the judiciary's jurisdiction, 
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cases in which Congress granted judicial review and expanded the 
courts' jurisdiction should be considered. Future studies should 
expand upon these findings by examining cases outside of this 
study's scope. 
Findings 
I found that between 1988 and 2004, Congress enacted 166 express 
denials of jurisdiction in 1 12 laws. The 104'~ Congress (1995-1 996) 
had the most denials at 27, while the 103'~ Congress (1993-1994) had 
the fewest at seven. Since the second session of the 100" Congress 
(1987-1988) alone had 19 denials, it is possible that the looth 
Congress may have actually passed the most. Table 1 presents the 
total number of denials enacted and the trends of denials over the 
studied period. 
As the table shows, there is no recognizable trend in the number 
of denials enacted in each Congress. The 1 0 4 ~ ~  Congress saw the 
enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and 
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, all laws 
that significantly limited the jurisdiction of the courts. It is possible 
that the Republican Party, which had attained majority control of 
both houses of Congress in 1994, was finally implementing its 
preferences in these policy areas. The 107'~ Congress was the 
Congress that dealt with the September 1 1, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
The 107'~ Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act and other 
legislation that included denials of jurisdiction to increase 
government secrecy and empower the executive branch to deal with 
reforms necessary to bolster homeland security. 
Other than the significant peaks in the 101", 104'~ and 1 0 7 ~ ~  
Congresses, there is no pattern in the number of express denials of 
jurisdiction. It is worth noting, however, that Congress regularly 
enacts at least a half-dozen or more denials of jurisdiction in a two- 
year period. While controversial and unpopular court decisions may 
spark a wave of jurisdiction-stripping proposals, a stream of 
jurisdictional denials constantly flows out of Congress without much 
publicity or prominent debate. 
Benjamin Keele 
Table 1: Enacted Denials by Congress, 1988-2004 
Number Total 
Number of Public Number Percentage 
of Laws of Public of Public 
Express with Laws Laws with 
Congress Denials Denials Enacted Denials 












1 0 6 ~ ~  
(1999-00) 




Total 166 112 4357 2.5% 
Most of the denials are narrow in scope. The majority of them 
relate to a specific decision or set of decisions by an executive 
branch official. Out of the 166 denials enacted in the studied period, 
144, or 86.7%, shielded actions by executive branch officials. One 
example is P.L. 101-649. A provision in the law shields decisions by 
the Attorney General relating to granting or denying temporary 
protected status to aliens. Presumably Congress included the denial 
of judicial review because Congress did not want aliens whose 
requests for temporary protected status were denied to be able to 
delay their deportation by litigating the denial. Another example is 
P.L. 102-579. Several provisions in the law prevent judicial review 
of determinations regarding the safety of transporting and disposing 
of radioactive transuranic waste materials. Since the disposal of 
Ganging Up Against the Courts 191 
radioactive materials is controversial and opposed by environmental 
groups and the communities near the storage sites, Congress 
probably wished to prevent litigation fiom delaying the disposal of 
these dangerous materials. 
Six denials, or 3.6% of the total number, bar judicial review of 
decisions made by administration officials in order to comply with 
international treaties. Certainly American foreign policy could be 
complicated by lawsuits challenging actions that are necessary for 
the United States to remain in compliance with its obligations to 
foreign nations. P.L. 100-330 blocks judicial review of orders to 
enforce a fisheries treaty between the United States and several 
Pacific Oceans islands. P.L. 100-418, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, contains provisions that deny the 
courts jurisdiction over actions by the government to enforce anti- 
dumping and countervailing duty laws. Traditionally the executive 
branch has been responsible for foreign relations and economic 
policy, so perhaps this was the rationale for keeping the judiciary 
from becoming involved in international trade disputes. 
Twelve, or 7.2%, of the denials place decisions over informant 
award programs outside of the judiciary's purview. The federal 
government has many award programs to provide incentives to 
informants and whistle-blowers. Awards are available for informing 
on insider trading (P.L. 100-704), defrauding the government (P.L. 
10 1- 123), falsifying drug statements (P.L. 102-282), making 
fraudulent telemarketing calls (P.L. 103-322), and conspiring to 
commit terrorist acts or traffic narcotics (P.L. 105-323). These 
jurisdictional exemptions seem to be justified on the basis of secrecy 
and efficiency. Gathering information from informants on any of a 
broad range of crimes requires secrecy to protect the integrity of the 
investigation and the security of the informants themselves. It would 
be difficult to protect informants and administer the awards program 
effectively if an informant could sue because she is displeased with 
the amount of her award. 
Many actions relating to employees of the Central Intelligence 
Agency are immune to judicial review. Denials of jurisdiction over 
CIA personnel decisions were enacted three times in the studied 
period. P.L. 102-496 denied jurisdiction to review decisions relating 
to the CIA'S retirement and disability system. P.L. 105-272 
prevented courts from reviewing actions of the CIA Director and the 
CIA Inspector General relating to complaints from CIA employees. 
Finally, decisions relating to the compensation, insurance and taxes 
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of undercover intelligence agents were shielded from judicial review 
by P.L. 108-487. Since it is difficult to maintain secrecy in civilian 
courts, it is likely that the CIA requested and Congress granted 
protection from judicial review over some of the ways the CIA deals 
with its agents and employees. 
Five, or 3.0%, of the denials of jurisdiction were used to settle 
disagreements over timber sale on federal land. Perhaps 
environmentalist advocacy groups were litigating or threatening to 
impede selling timber or building roads in national parks, so 
Congress made the decisions relating to selling timber or building 
roads in those parks unreviewable. For example, P.L. 100-446 
finalized the Forest Service's plan to sell timber and build roads in 
the Silver Complex Fire Recovery Area of the Siskiyou National 
Forest and sell timber from the Mapleton Ranger District of the 
Siuslaw National Forest. Forest Service guidelines for selling timber 
in Washington and Oregon were at the center of a court dispute. In 
P.L. 101-121, Congress denied the courts jurisdiction to review any 
sales permitted by an agreement between the government and the 
plaintiffs. 
Between 1988 and 2004, Congress enacted two denials covering 
federal laws and two denials related to administrative regulations. So 
the vast majority of denials of jurisdiction do not prevent review of 
legislation or regulations, the type of denial most frequently 
mentioned in the media. Rather, most of the denials are narrowly 
tailored to protect specific executive actions and decisions. Instead of 
passing the Marriage Protection Act to shield an entire section of the 
United States Code from review, Congress is enacting denials of 
jurisdiction like one contained in P.L. 108-7 that prevents courts 
from reviewing the distribution of payments to tobacco farmers. 
Discussion 
Because most unreviewable actions are undertaken in the executive 
branch, congressional denials of jurisdiction relate as much to the 
separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive as they 
relate to the separation between the judiciary and legislature. 
Determinations on the legality of many decisions are being made 
between members of Congress and administration officials, who then 
exclude the judiciary from participating. Since many of the decisions 
over which judicial review is prohibited are narrow in scope, related 
to national security (an area the judiciary tends to tread lightly in any 
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case), or merely part of the implementation of a larger project that is 
judicially reviewable, the distortion this phenomenon has on the 
relationship between the three branches is probably slight. 
It must be emphasized that if this study had undertaken the task 
of counting every grant of jurisdiction, the number of grants would 
far outweigh the number of denials. Denying jurisdiction, while more 
common than may be generally perceived, is still the exception to the 
rule of granting judicial review. However, the available data do not 
allow us to be certain that the practice has not become more common 
over time. While the number of jurisdictional denials over the last 16 
years has been related to shifts of political power and catastrophic 
events, it is possible that the legislature and executive may be 
tending more often to exclude the judiciary from the decision- 
making process. If this practice becomes more prevalent, it will 
constitute a major shift of power from the judicial branch to the 
legislative and executive branches that draft and implement the laws. 
Another aspect of the current practice of limiting the jurisdiction 
of the courts that may raise concern is the low level of public 
attention paid to it. While bills with sweeping and controversial 
denials of jurisdiction are heavily covered and debated in the news 
media, smaller denials of executive decisions are largely ignored. 
Ironically, the very characteristics of the proposals that are heavily 
discussed are also those that make it extremely unlikely that the bill 
will pass. The provisions that are likely to be enacted, however, are 
innocuously inserted into legislation and enacted without fanfare. 
This lack of attention is due to several factors. First, the bills that 
contain these denials are not identified as bills to reduce the 
jurisdiction of the courts. Rather, they are presented as proposals to 
reform Medicare, to k n d  the Department of the Interior, or to 
implement an international treaty. The denial of jurisdiction is a 
minor detail, one sentence that surely is knowingly inserted but not 
carefully examined. Second, the areas over which jurisdiction is 
denied are generally narrow and obscure, hardly interesting material 
for a newspaper story or television broadcast. Third, since the set of 
people whose potential lawsuits are barred by the provision is 
relatively small (again because the scope of the denial is narrow), 
there are few people to complain when their ability to be heard in 
court is threatened. 
The lack of publicity over this aspect of the relationship between 
the branches of government also carries the risk that American 
citizens, happily presuming that their interests, if necessary, can be 
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vindicated in court, are actually having their right to be heard in 
court quietly taken away from them. Provisions of the Anti- 
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and USA 
PATRIOT Act restrict judicial review over important individual 
rights (habeas corpus review and national security letters, 
respectively) but do not entirely eliminate it and thus were not 
counted in this study. Nonetheless, if the practice of denying the 
courts jurisdiction outright becomes more commonplace, important 
rights over which judicial review is currently circumscribed may be 
barred from the courthouse. 
Certainly the executive and legislative branches are politically 
accountable, but the voters cannot vote for or against a candidate on 
the basis of information they do not possess. To mention a parallel 
case, no legislator need fear severe electoral repercussions for his 
vote on the intelligence budget, because the budget is classified. 
Likewise, provisions that are unclassified but so obscure as to be 
virtually unknown to the electorate do not have consequences at the 
ballot box. Many of the jurisdictional denials are buried in large and 
complex pieces of legislation. This makes it difficult for citizens, the 
press, or even most legislators to notice the denials and voice any 
concerns. 
If this is the case, which branch is most likely to make wise 
policy decisions and protect individual rights? It is difficult to say. 
On the one hand, Congress and the administration possess 
information and experience that is unavailable to the courts. On the 
other hand, the executive's and legislature's enmeshment in the 
political process and the influences of interest groups that affect it 
may mean that some groups are unjustly harmed by decisions that 
are also rendered immune to judicial review. As one scholar wrote 
about the Founders' view of the courts, "the supporters of the 
Constitution believed that the most dangerous branch, the one with 
the greatest capacity to annoy or injure rights, would be the 
legislature, because, through it, a majority actuated by a sense of 
injustice could effect its designs" (Kozlowski 2003, 85-86, emphasis 
in original). The courts are supposed to protect rights and invalidate 
actions that violate legal rights. It may be true that the decisions 
Congress has protected from judicial review would have passed 
muster and the denial of jurisdiction merely made the administration 
of public policy more efficient. However, there is no way of knowing 
this because any level of judicial review has been foreclosed by the 
jurisdictional denial. Congressional denial of the courts' 
Ganging Up Against the Courts 195 
jurisdiction and the public's low level of awareness of the practice 
raise issues relating to the transparency of executive decision-making 
and individual rights. 
Conclusion 
This study has revealed what is a largely unexamined practice in 
congressional and executive policy-making: shielding executive 
determinations from judicial review. Regardless of whether Congress 
is appropriately exercising its constitutional authority, history 
demonstrates that Congress has proposed and passed legislation 
denying jurisdiction over certain cases and decisions. Again, it must 
be acknowledged that Congress grants judicial review far more often 
than it denies it. But it must also be recognized that the practice in 
which Congress and the executive branch are engaged raises 
concerns for the future of the constitutional separation of powers, 
open governance and protection of individual rights. 
Further studies should be conducted to determine more 
accurately the nature of the denials of jurisdiction, the public 
perception (or lack thereof) of this governmental behavior, how the 
judiciary has responded to these denials, and the historical trends 
prior to 1988. This information will help us better assess the wisdom 
and propriety of Congress' use of its power to make exceptions to 
and regulations of the judiciary's jurisdiction. 
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Appendix to Benjamin Keele, "Ganging Up Against the Courte: Congressional Curtailment of 
Judicial Review, 1988-2004 
Express Congressional Denials of Judicial Review Between the 100th and 108th Congress 
Statutorv Provision 
P.L. 100-274,102 Stat. 48,§3 
P.L. 100-330,102 Stat. 591, $11 
Ibid, $1320 
Ibid, $1321 
Law or Action not Reviewable 
Determination by Secretary to acquire materials 
and services for the production of coinage from 
foreign sources. 
Orders by the Secretary enforcing 
the Treaty on Fisheries Between the 
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and 
the Government of the United States of America 
P.L. 100-418,102 Stat. 1107, $1316 Determinations by the administering authority 
that a country does not operate under a market 
economy 
Determinations by the administering authority 
relating to monitoring in trade a downstream 
product 
Decisions by the administering authority relating 
to categorizing merchandise proposed for 




Provisions of 50 USCS Appx §2170(d), which 
prescribe the determinations the President must 
make before suspending or prohibiting an 
acquisition, merger or takeover of a person 
engaged in interstate commerce that threaten 
national security 
P.L. 100-427, 102 Stat. 1603, $25 Decisions by the Secretary not to 
permit tribal governments' use of Bureau of 
Indian Affairs facilities 
P.L. 100-435,102 Stat. 1645, $603 Determinations by the Secretary concerning 
whether a State agency had good cause for its 
failure to meet error tolerance levels 
P.L. 100-446,102 Stat. 1774, $320 Final Environmental Impact Statement, Record 
of Decision, and Forest Service decisions relating 
to timber sales and road construction in the Silver 
Complex Fire Recovery Area of the Siskiyou 
National Forest. 
Decisions by Secretary to sell timber from the 
Mapleton Ranger District of the Siuslaw National 
Forest. 
P.L. 100-449,102 Stat. 1851, $401 Decisions by administering authority or United 
States Customs Service to suspend liquidation of 
entries of merchandise. 
Ibid, $403 
P.L. 100-499,102 Stat. 2491,$6 
Decisions regarding the disclosure or 
nondisclosure of material under protective order. 
The RARE I1 Final Environmental 
Statement of January 1979 with respect to the 
National Forest System in Oklahoma. 
P.L. 100-532,102 Stat. 2654, $102 Content of list of registered pesticides and 
guidelines for formatting studies and identifying 
information that may not meet regulatory 
P.L. 100-678,102 Stat. 4049, $6 
requirements. 
P.L. 100-547,102 Stat. 2736,8202 The RARE I1 Final Environmental 
Statement of January 1979 with respect to the 
National Forest System in Alabama. 
P.L. 100-653,102 Stat. 3825, $703 Valuations of in-kind contributions and personal 
property from California to pay for cost of study 
of fishery resources in the Russian River basin. 
Determinations that noncompliance with building 
codes or zoning laws is necessary for national 
security. 
P.L. 100-690,102 Stat. 4181, $7522 Decisions to retain or transfer to other agencies 
materials that are subject to civil forfeiture. 
P.L. 100-704,102 Stat. 4677,$3 Determinations to award bounties to informants. 
P.L. 101-73,103 Stat. 183, $212 Determinations to deny claims or portions of 




P.L. 101-123,103 Stat. 759, $2 
over which the Corporation is receiver or for 
actions or omissions of the Corporation as 
receiver. 
Determinations not to disclose information in 
reports of savings associations. 
Decisions of Appraisal Subcommittee on 
recognizing state appraiser certifying and 
licensing agencies. 
Decisions by the liquidating agent to disallow 
claims; claims for payment from any institution 
over which the liquidating agent is receiver or for 
actions or omissions of the liquidating agent as 
receiver. 
P.L. 101-121,103 Stat. 701,§318 Forest Service Guidelines concerning timber sales 
in Washington and Oregon; timber sales 
permitted by agreement between the Forest 
Service and plaintiffs. 
Failure of the Attorney General to make 
payments to whistleblowers. 
P.L. 101-189,103 Stat. 1352, $1301 Denials of review by Court of Military Appeals 
not subject to certiorari review by Supreme 
Court. 
P.L. 101-195,103 Stat. 1784, $5 
Ibid, $6102 
P.L. 101-401,104 Stat. 863, $5 
P.L. 101-452,104 Stat. 1054, $5 
The RARE I1 Final Environmental 
Statement of January 1979 with respect to the 
National Forest System in Nevada. 
P.L. 101-222,103 Stat. 1892, $6 Designations of items as defense articles or 
defense services. 
P.L. 101-239,103 Stat. 2106, $6003 Decisions of the Secretary on changing the 
geographic classification of hospitals. 
Determinations of historical payment bases, 
relative values and relative value units, 
conversion factors; establishment of geographic 
adjustment factors and a system for the coding of 
physicians' services. 
The RARE I1 Final Environmental 
Statement of January 1979 with respect to  the 
National Forest System in Maine. 
Valuations of in-kind contributions and personal 
property from Washington to pay for cost of 
study of fishery resources in the Chehalis River 
Basin. 
P.L. 101-508,104 Stat. 1388, $10301 Estimates of number of expected aliens and 
amount of the United States Travel and Tourism 
Facilitation Fee for a given calendar year. 
Ibid, VOl 
Ibid, $701 
P.L. 101-552,104 Stat. 2736, $4 
P.L. 101-592,104 Stat. 2943,§9 
P.L. 101-601,104 Stat. 3048, $9 
P.L. 101-549,104 Stat. 2399,5228 Determinations to assess a civil penalty exceeding 
$200,000. 
Ibid, $301 Determinations of priorities for the promulgation 
of emission standards; reports of the Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. 
Corrections or failures to correct data affecting 
Phase I1 units' baselines and actual 1985 
emissions rates. 
Determinations to assess civil penalties greater 
than $200,000 or assessing civil penalties on 
violations that occurred more than 12 months 
ago. 
Agency decisions to use or not use arbitration 
procedures; decisions to terminate arbitration 
proceedings or vacate an arbitral award. 
Final civil penalties not subject to review in 
recovery actions. 
Final civil penalties not subject to review in 
recovery actions. 
P.L. 101-625,104 Stat. 4079, $108 Explanations in jurisdictions' reports regarding 
the effect of public policies on affordable housing. 
P.L. 101-647,104 Stat. 4789, 52587 
P.L. 101-648,104 Stat. 4969,§3 
P.L. 101-649,104 Stat. 4978,5302 
P.L. 102-29 105 Stat. 169, $3 
P.L. 102-240,105 Stat. 1914, 52502 
P.L. 102-282,106 Stat. 149,§3 
P.L. 102-306,106 Stat. 260,54 
P.L. 102-325,106 Stat. 448,51317 
P.L. 102-344,106 Stat. 921, 52 
Decisions by the Attorney General to award or 
not award payments to informants of financial 
institution offenses. 
Agency actions establishing, assisting or 
terminating negotiated rulemaking committees. 
Determinations of Attorney General relating to 
temporary protected status of aliens. 
Determinations and reports by Special Board 
mediating railroad labor disputes. 
Notice of delayed action extension of comment 
period or completion period on proposed 
rulemaking regarding motor vehicle safety. 
Final civil penalties not subject to review in 
recovery actions; informant awards. 
Decisions of arbiter in mediating railroad labor 
disputes. 
Regulations relating to higher education tribal 
grants. 
Determinations by the Director of the Census 





P.L. 102-496,106 Stat. 3180, $802 Determinations by the Director of Central 
Intelligence relating to the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System. 
P.L. 102-567,106 Stat. 4270, $811 Final civil penalties not subject to review in 
recovery actions. 
P.L. 102-579,106 Stat. 4777, $6 Determinations and certifications by various 
officials preceding the commencement of test 
phase for disposing of transuranic waste. 
Survey required before commencement of disposal 
of transuranic waste. 
Determinations by Administrators regarding 
facility's compliance with final disposal 
regulations. 
Determinations by Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission that packages for transporting 
transuranic waste meets quality assurance 
requirements. 
P.L. 102-587,106 Stat. 5039, $8011 Final civil penalties not subject to review in 
recovery actions. 
P.L. 103-66,107 Stat. 312, $6003 Changes in Federal Communications Commission 
regulatory fees. 
P.L. 103-322,108 Stat. 1796, $60009 Determinations by Attorney General that foreign 
murder of a United States national took place in 
Ibid, $250004 
P.L. 103-354,108 Stat. 3178, $304 
P.L. 103-407,108 Stat. 4210, $8 
P.L. 103-438,108 Stat. 4597, $9 
P.L. 103-465,108 Stat. 4809, $801 
P.L. 104-13,109 Stat. 163, $2 
P.L. 104-99,110 Stat. 26, $407 
P.L. 104-121,110 Stat. 847,9212 
Ibid, $251 
country in which the person is no longer present 
and the country lacks the ability to lawfully 
secure the person's return. 
Decisions of Attorney General relating to awards 
to informants. 
$304, which establishes the Office of Risk 
Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis in the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. 
Final civil penalties not subject to review in 
recovery actions. 
Determinations regarding foreign cooperation in 
antitrust investigations. 
Award by the Federal Communications 
Commission of preferences and awards released 
February 3,1994. 
Determinations by Director to approve or not act 
upon a collection of information contained in an 
agency rule. 
Actions by Secretary relating to foreclosure 
avoidance. 
Small entity compliance guides. 
Congressional review and disapproval of 
administrative rules. 
P.L. 104-130,110 Stat. 1200, $2 
P.L. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214, $401 
Ibid, $440 
Ibid, $815 
P.L. 104-134,110 Stat. 1321, Title I1 
P.L. 104-164,110 Stat. 1421, $157 
P.L. 104-170,110 Stat. 1489,9210 
Ibid, $405 
P.L. 104-182,110 Stat. 1613,5102 
P.L. 104-201,110 Stat. 2422, $657 
P.L. 104-204,110 Stat. 2874, $427 
Congressional identification of limited tax 
benefits. 
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